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I. Introduction
A two-stage model with investment in the first period and quantity or price competition in the second seems to be a simple but appropriate model for long-term competition in an oligopoly. Higher investment usually decreases marginal costs, e.g. via economies of scale or via R&D for cost saving technologies. Beginning with Spence (1977) , a large number of models with this structure has been discussed.
The usual assumptions in the literature (with some exceptions) are "quantity competition with substitutes and strategic substitutes". Often homogeneous goods and/or duopolies are assumed.
Sometimes interest is focussed on market entry where the model structure is slightly altered: only the incumbent invests in period 1 while the entrant chooses investment (possibly equal to 0, i.e. no entry) and price or quantity simultaneously in period 2. In particular, the seminal work of Fudenberg and Tirole (1984) and Bulow et al. (1983) has lead to the impression that the logic of such models is principally understood.
The consequences of such a model structure are often described as over-or underinvestment. While Brander and Spencer (1983) evaluate investment with respect to the "naïve" benchmark 2 of whether the closed loop (subgame perfect) equilibrium quantities are produced efficiently, Fudenberg and Tirole (1984) as well as Bulow et al. (1985) propose the open loop equilibrium (where investment and prices/quantities are chosen simultaneously) as a benchmark for over-and under-investment. Their reasoning is that the open loop benchmark incorporates non-strategic investment (efficient production of the open loop equilibrium quantities) so that "over " and "under" express the consequences of strategic considerations. We could also interpret such a benchmark as the goal of a regulator who wants production to be efficient. In the energy sector, for example, inefficient production may be accompanied by unnecessarily high levels of CO 2 emissions (under-investment) or too many highly controversial nuclear power plants (over-investment) . The open loop benchmark is also used by Okuno-Fujiwara and Suzumura (1993) and Murphy and Smeers (2005) .
Many authors prefer to compare equilibrium investment in the two stage (closed loop) equilibrium with socially optimal investment, usually in the form of a second best welfare optimum. Second best means that only investment is regulated, but not competition in the second stage of the game. Suzumura (1992) , and Okuno-Fujiwara and Suzumura (1993) apply this benchmark. In this paper, we want to concentrate on the three benchmarks mentioned above.
There are papers which use other benchmarks, namely the first best welfare optimum (Suzumura, 1992; Elberfeld, 2003; Murphy and Smeers, 2005) or cooperation among the oligopolists in the first round (Suzumura, 1992; Long and Sobeyran, 2001 ). Some papers are not directly concerned with under-/over-investment but instead study optimal taxes or subsidies (Besley and Suzumura, 1992; Vetter, 2007) . As the above citations show, several papers use multiple benchmarks. On the other hand, there are papers which investigate the subgame perfect equilibrium (the closed loop solution) without comparisons (Tseng, 2003; Grant and Quiggin, 1996) .
A number of two-stage games which seem to be different at first glance can be interpreted in the above frame work (see Shapiro, 1989) . Allaz (1992) and Bolle (1993) , for example, discuss the consequences of the introduction of a futures market (for oligopolies such as electricity). In this case the benchmark is the non-existence of such a market (zero investment, i.e. buying/selling of futures contracts). Other applications may suggest further benchmarks.
A common attribute of the three benchmarks which we will discuss is that there is oligopolistic competition in the second stage. Thus, it should not be too difficult to extend the investigation to the benchmark "cooperation of the oligopolists in the first stage" and to other benchmarks which share this common attribute. I think, however, such an extension would overload the paper. A general comparison with the first best welfare optimum would be more difficult because the decisions in the second stage are also involved. Discussing the first best optimum is often the same as substituting the industry with a regulated monopoly.
There are a number of extensions of the basic model: more periods of investment (e.g. Stanford, 1986; Athey and Schmutzler, 2001; Bolle and Breitmoser, 2004), spillovers in R&D (d'Aspremont and Jacquemin 1988; Kamien et al.; 1992) , incomplete information (Vives, 1989; Somma, 1999) , and others. We will not consider such extensions, but instead concentrate on the role of benchmarks in the basic case.
In the next section we describe the basic model and its subgame perfect equilibrium within a conventional model with minimal assumptions. In Section III, we add the (conventional) assumptions of symmetry and of stability of the second stage market and show that for the naïve benchmark, the following theorem applies: The main part of the paper concentrates on quantity competition in the second stage.
The investigation of price competition is relegated to the appendix. It implies the same qualitative results as quantity competition. Section VII reports 3 and discusses the joint results, in particular the additional distinctions which must be introduced.
II. Competition with cost functions
In principle, we may distinguish three stages of decisions. In the first stage, technology is chosen, i.e. firms invest in R&D, buy patents, sign licence contracts, purchase sites, and seek strategic partnerships. In hierarchical production processes 3 See Table 1 in Section VII.
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"make or buy" decisions are also important. These decisions influence marginal costs mainly due to the choice of technology but also because of license fees, transportation costs (and modes), and transaction costs. In the second stage, capacity is built which may influence marginal costs due to economies of scale and scope. In the third stage, we have competition in quantities, prices, or other instruments. We will simplify this structure by merging stages 2 and 3. Alternatively we could merge stages 1 and 2 or we could analyse the three-stage game. Apart from the fact that we follow the bulk of the literature, both alternatives would be more complicated.
The technologies available to firm i are described by a one-parameter family of cost
The first two requirements are standard. The third requirement is that the marginal Game CC (competition with cost functions):
Stage 2 (Competition with Quantities): Firm i chooses i x . Demand for the product of firm i is described by the inverse demand function ( )
We assume that interior equilibria of the game exist. We denote a subgame perfect equilibrium of game CC as ( ) Applying the Implicit Function Theorem, we obtain
is a diagonal matrix with negative diagonal elements Firm i's best reply to i c − , the technology choice of the other firms, is derived from
, and
Contrary to eq. (8), cost efficiency requires
For equilibrium values, the difference between eqs. (8) and (9) is
The implicit function
is positive (negative).
Definition:
The following derivatives are evaluated at ( )
, i.e. if goods are complements, and 
We define
Otherwise, we set 0 :
, then x is produced with over-investment (underinvestment) according to the naïve benchmark.
Proof: Because of relations (1), the implicit functions
We could generalize Proposition 1 by defining i g and i h for every firm i separately,
i.e. Proposition 1 applies also for a market where some goods are (strategic) substitutes and others are (strategic) complements. 
).
•
The sign of h can be determined by the Implicit Function Theorem -but that requires either numerical values or special cases. In the next section, we assume symmetric and stable 4 equilibria, in which case we obtain 1 h − = for strategic complements and 1 h + = for strategic substitutes.
III. Symmetric and stable equilibria
Assumptions:
The game CC is symmetric and has interior symmetric equilibria ( )
The symmetric second stage equilibria of the CC game are stable.
In symmetric games, all producers can choose from the same set of technologies.
For symmetric (inverse) demand functions p i (x) the variables j x and k x , i≠ j,k, are interchangeable and we have
In a symmetric equilibrium all i c are equal, i.e. we have ) ,..., ( Lemma 1: Evaluated at symmetric and stable second stage equilibria, the following relations hold: 
The first part of (iv) follows from eqs. (13) and (14), the second part is implied by relation (12). Corollary: The Folk Theorem described in the Introduction applies for the naïve benchmark.
Proof: Proposition 1 and Lemma 1 (ii).
IV. The open loop benchmark
We now confront the subgame perfect (closed loop) equilibrium ( ) (i) In the benchmark game EC, the second order condition for best replies is a negative definite Hessian of the profit function, i.e.
For strategic substitutes, relation (16) The example in Section VI will show that, for strategic complements, (C1+) may or may not be fulfilled. There, we will also show that additional stability assumptions cannot avoid the distinction.
V. The (second best) welfare benchmark
Welfare is measured here as the sum of consumers' and producers' surplus, i.e. We say that there is under-(over-) investment with respect to the welfare benchmark
The equilibrium quantities implied by ĉ are
is the same function as in the previous sections. We can now proceed as in the last section, except that eqs. (8) are substituted by eqs. (18), i.e. i z is substituted by
with a and b defined in eq. have the same sign. In the case "complements and strategic substitutes" we need n>2 and a very weak additional assumption, namely
For substitutes, the result of the comparison depends on the question of how differentiated the goods are. In the case of substitutes and strategic substitutes, sufficient alternative conditions are:
(C2-) limits the homogeneity of the goods while (C2+) requires sufficient homogeneity. For n=2 and linear demand functions
requires 1 ≥ γ , i.e. homogeneous goods or "more than homogeneous" goods which may be interpreted as "network effects". With increasing n, the set of cases not covered by (C2-) and (C2+) becomes smaller.
In case of substitutes and strategic complements, sufficient alternative conditions are: (
Thus we get 
From (13) and (14) we get the unique second stage equilibrium (25) and (28) (27)). So, in Figure 4 , we cannot assume constant r, but for every s and γ the indications "over-/under-investment" apply for those r which guarantee interior solutions. to see that EC is a supermodular game and, due to our assumption of a unique equilibrium, this equilibrium is globally stable (Vives, 2000, p. 54) .
VI. Summary and conclusion
The investigation of price competition is relegated to the appendix. The joint results are summarized in Table 1 below.
The results with respect to price competition are nearly the same as for quantity competition. Note, however, that the weak assumption (A6) is not needed in the case of price competition. The conditions (C1), (C2), (C3) are rather similar but not identical. (C1-) describes cases in which all producers investing the same additional amount has a negative net effect on marginal costs (taking into account increased equilibrium production in the second stage). (C2+) and (C3+) both require goods to be sufficiently homogeneous, (C2-) and (C3-) require them to be sufficiently heterogeneous.
We can see in Table 1 that the Folk Theorem applies only for the naïve benchmark.
Additional conditions determine the outcome for the other two benchmarks. It is interesting that under the welfare benchmark with sufficiently homogeneous substitutes and strategic substitutes, n = 2 may be special. Such a result is also found by Elberfeld (2003) . It should be easy to generalize the investigation with respect to cooperation of the producers in the first stage. Other benchmarks may turn out to be more difficult to handle. apply, high heterogeneity means: (C2-) or (C3-) apply.
The paper relies on assumptions (which should always apply) and conditions (which may or may not apply). Conditions (C2) and (C3) have an easily interpretable meaning. Condition (C1) is more technical. The question remains whether it can also be given a more elementary interpretation. The most restrictive assumption in this paper is symmetry. There is little hope, however, to generally deal with asymmetric cases except in the special case n = 2 or under special assumptions such as where only two technologies are available (Elberfeld, 2003) . We can assume that the above results also hold under "nearly symmetric" circumstances and thus offer us a reference for principal policy decisions. For essentially asymmetric cases, only numerical simulations seem to be possible.
The message of this paper is that investment in two stage models (with a symmetry assumption) can indeed be qualitatively characterized. It is, however, necessary to explicitly specify the benchmark and, depending on the benchmark, to observe additional conditions.
Appendix: Price competition
Demand for the (potentially) heterogeneous goods is described by
; costs are as in ( Note that the definition of h corresponds to that in the case of quantity competition. Proof: See Figure 5 .
As in the case of quantity competition we investigate symmetric equilibria. The derivatives k i dc dp / can again be computed with the Implicit Function Theorem. α and β are defined by the second derivatives of G i with respect to prices, but otherwise the arguments are exactly the same as in Section III.
Lemma 3:
The following derivatives are valuated at symmetric and stable equilibria. Proof: Proposition 4 and Lemma 3 (ii).
